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Abstract
Robustness is an increasingly important property of machine
learning models as they become more and more prevalent. We
propose a defense against adversarial examples based on a
k-nearest neighbor (kNN) on the intermediate activation of
neural networks. Our scheme surpasses state-of-the-art de-
fenses on MNIST and CIFAR-10 against `2-perturbation by
a significant margin. With our models, the mean perturbation
norm required to fool our MNIST model is 3.07 and 2.30 on
CIFAR-10. Additionally, we propose a simple certifiable lower
bound on the `2-norm of the adversarial perturbation using
a more specific version of our scheme, a 1-NN on represen-
tations learned by a Lipschitz network. Our model provides
a nontrivial average lower bound of the perturbation norm,
comparable to other schemes on MNIST with similar clean
accuracy.
1 Introduction
Given adequate data and compute power, neural net-
works have demonstrated their potential to surpass human-
level performance on various benchmarks such as image
classification (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012;
Simonyan and Zisserman 2014), playing complex games
(Silver et al. 2017b; Silver et al. 2017a; Mnih et al. 2013),
controlling driverless vehicles (Chen et al. 2015; Bojarski
et al. 2016), and medical imaging (Litjens et al. 2017).
Nonetheless, it is well-known that neural networks and other
machine learning classifiers still have a number of flaws,
one of which is their excessive sensitivity to small per-
turbation (i.e. adversarial examples) (Biggio et al. 2013;
Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015;
Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2015; Nguyen, Yosin-
ski, and Clune 2015).
We propose that kNN on representations learned by neural
networks can serve as a simple yet strong defense against
adversarial examples, surpassing state-of-the-art defenses in
an `2-norm setting on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our model is
illustrated in Figure 1. On MNIST, our best model requires
an average perturbation size of 3.07 in order to reduce the
accuracy to zero, surpassing the state-of-the-art by 0.77 (but
with a modest drop of 1.7% on clean accuracy). Our best
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Figure 1: Illustration of our setup: the kNN search is done
on the intermediate output of a neural network instead of the
input space.
model on CIFAR-10 also outperforms the state-of-the-art by
a large margin, increasing the mean adversarial perturbation
to 2.30. Our results also suggest that replacing the final linear
fully-connected layer in a network with a kNN consistently
results in a more robust classifier.
In fact, there are multiple evidences of robustness of kNN
in adversarial settings from both theoretical perspectives
(Wang, Jha, and Chaudhuri 2018; Khoury and Hadfield-
Menell 2019) and empirical analyses (Papernot, McDaniel,
and Goodfellow 2016; Papernot and McDaniel 2018; Schott
et al. 2019; Dubey et al. 2019). Despite its potential, kNN
is known to not perform well on high-dimensional data like
most of real-world image datasets. Therefore, by doing the
neighbor search on representations learned by neural nets,
we hope to obtain the robustness benefit of kNN as well as
the flexibility and the performance of neural nets. We explore
different choices of networks to use as the feature extractor
across various models and training methods.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that a 1-NN on intermediate
outputs of a Lipschitz network can serve as a certifiable
defense where the lower bound of `2-norm of perturbation
required to change the classification of a given input can be
computed. With similar accuracy to the heuristic defense, our
certifiable defense is able to provide a reasonable lower bound
(0.86) comparable to the previous works’. It can certify that
classification of 80% of the test samples cannot be changed
by a perturbation with an `2-norm of 0.5 or less, or 36% with
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1 or less. We hope that our scheme suggests a possibility
of defending against adversarial examples with a form of
similarity search as well as sheds some light on architecture
designs for robust neural networks. The code we use for all of
the experiments can be found at https://github.com/
chawins/knn-defense.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are a type of an evasion attack against
machine learning models. Most adversarial examples on
deep neural networks are generated by adding very small
perturbation to legitimate samples (Szegedy et al. 2013;
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015). Previous works
propose algorithms for finding such perturbation within some
`p-norm ball which can be formulated as solving the follow-
ing optimization problem:
xadv = x+ δ
∗ where δ∗ = arg max
δ
L(x+ δ) (1)
such that ‖δ‖p ≤ d
where L is some loss function associated with the correct pre-
diction of a clean sample x by the target neural network. The
`p-norm constraint is treated as a proxy to imperceptibility
of the noise.
2.2 Robustness of k-Nearest Neighbors
The kNN classifier is a popular non-parametric classifier that
predicts the label of an input by finding its k nearest neighbors
in some distance metric such as Euclidean or cosine distance
and taking a majority vote from the labels of the neighbors.
While kNN has been widely used and well-studied for a long
time, it has been barely investigated in adversarial settings.
To the extent of our knowledge, only the four following
works directly study the adversarial robustness of kNN. Am-
saleg et al. prove that under certain assumptions, the robust-
ness of kNN is correlated with the intrinsic dimension of
the data. Wang et al. provide a lower bound on the required
value of k such that robustness of kNN can approach that
of the Bayes Optimal classifier (Wang, Jha, and Chaudhuri
2018). Sitawarin & Wagner propose an attack on kNN for-
mulated as an optimization problem. Most recently, Khoury
and Hadfield-Menell claim, under certain assumptions, that
kNN is naturally robust because the Voronoi cells extend in
directions orthogonal to the data manifold which are believed
to be exploited by adversarial examples.
While the previous works provides some evidences sug-
gesting the robustness of plain kNN on the `2 metric, the
main drawbacks of kNN are its scalability and its low accu-
racy on most real-world datasets. The scalability problem is
well-studied and can be addressed with approximate algo-
rithms or optimized data-structures. In this work, we suggest
that a kNN on representations of neural networks, as opposed
to directly on the input, can achieve relatively high accuracy
while maintaining its robustness property.
2.3 Deep k-Nearest Neighbors
DkNN, proposed by Papernot & McDaniel, is a scheme that
can be applied to any deep learning model, offering inter-
pretability and robustness through a nearest neighbor search
in each of the deep representation layers. The scheme also
demonstrates the possibility of detecting adversarial exam-
ples and out-of-distribution samples. Soft nearest neighbor
(SNN) loss, a regularization proposed by the follow-up work,
that encourages entanglement between samples of different
classes in the representation space can increase the detection
accuracy (Frosst, Papernot, and Hinton 2019).
One may question the scalability of DkNN on large-scale
datasets in term of both performance and accuracy. Dubey
et al. (Dubey et al. 2019) applies kNN on representation
space of ImageNet models and achieves both reasonable
accuracy and improvement on adversarial robustness. They
employ a fast but approximate nearest-neighbor search which
makes the system feasible on a dataset with more than one
billion images. However, in this work, the kNN is not used to
obtain the final prediction but only to search for the neighbors.
Instead, the final output is obtained by taking a weighted
average of the softmax of the neighbors.
Furthermore, none of the three previous works explore rep-
resentations from different networks other than those trained
with cross-entropy loss. In fact, our work suggests that un-
supervised representations as well as adversarial training
can yield higher robustness than a vanilla CNN trained with
cross-entropy loss.
3 k-Nearest Neighbor on Representations
While general trends suggest that robust networks usually
suffer from low clean accuracy, we believe that kNN is a
simple scheme that can push this trade-off curve further. Ro-
bust networks are insensitive to small changes in the input,
but consequently, they cannot express an abrupt change in
the output. This makes them unable to separate two samples
from different classes that are very close together, resulting
in low accuracy.
On the other hand, kNN does not suffer as much from
such constraint since it can attain high accuracy as long as a
distance metric in the input space is meaningful or the data
exhibit some local structure. However, this assumption is not
necessarily true for real-world datasets. Therefore, we aim
to rely on neural networks as feature extractors to robustly
map inputs to representations that satisfy this assumption and
then using a kNN to make the classification on top of the
representations.
Our system is simple. After training, weights of the net-
work are frozen and used as a feature extractor. All the train-
ing samples are passed through the network to obtain the
representations on a specified layer and then stored for the
kNN part. At test time, features are extracted from an input
and treated as a query to the kNN which returns indices of
the k nearest representations in the training set.
We build the kNN part on a Python library called Faiss
(Johnson, Douze, and Jégou 2017), which implements many
algorithms for similarity search. Unless stated otherwise, we
use Euclidean distance and choose k to be 75 for all of the
models as suggested by Papernot & McDaniel. We use an
exact search as we require an accurate ordering and exact
distances for a relatively large k. We explore two different
settings where this scheme can be used: (1) as a heuristic
defense (Section 4 and 5), and (2) as a certifiable defense
(Section 6).
4 Heuristic Defense on MNIST
4.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the robustness and the accuracy of our defense
on representations learned by seven different models as well
as the adversarially trained version of some of the models.
The seven models include four supervised models: (1) vanilla
CNN (Basic Network), (2) network trained with soft nearest
neighbor loss (SNN loss) (Frosst, Papernot, and Hinton 2019),
(3) network trained with input mixup (Zhang et al. 2018),
and (4) network trained with manifold mixup (Verma et al.
2019). The other three are unsupervised models: (5) autoen-
coder (Ballard 1987), (6) VAE (Kingma and Welling 2014),
and (7) rotation prediction (Gidaris, Singh, and Komodakis
2018). We experiment with a wide variety of models since
we are interested in the robustness of the features learned by
networks trained on various objectives.
Evaluating the SNN loss is a natural choice as it appears
to improve the original DkNN (Frosst, Papernot, and Hin-
ton 2019). We experiment with a few choices of α (both
positive and negative) and choose to report only the best
one, α = 1, which encourages disentanglement between
samples of different classes. For the mixup loss, the net-
work is trained with a linear interpolation of a pair of inputs
(at the input space and/or the feature space) and their la-
bels. The authors argue that it improves the interpolation
behavior of the representation and has shown some im-
provement in the adversarial robustness (Zhang et al. 2018;
Verma et al. 2019). Here, the manifold mixup model uses
mixup on all the layers including the input.
In additional to supervised models, we are interested in
unsupervised learning as it is not well-studied in the context
of adversarial examples. With no access to labels, unsuper-
vised models may learn very different sets of features from
the supervised ones which only rely on features that help
discriminate labels of the input. Arguably, representations
learned by unsupervised methods such as generative models
may contain more information of the input as they have to re-
construct it accurately rather than simply predicting its class.
The redundancy or the extra information may provide more
robustness against adversarial examples which usually rely
on making small changes on some parts of the input.
For the unsupervised methods, the autoencoder is trained
with MSE reconstruction loss in the pixel space. The VAE is
trained by optimizing the ELBO, and the output is treated as
Bernoulli random variables (Kingma and Welling 2014). The
rotation prediction is a self-supervised method that trains a
model to recognize orientation of the input (Gidaris, Singh,
and Komodakis 2018). Here, we use four rotations (0, 90,
180, and 270 degrees). Surprisingly, the rotation network we
train is able to predict the rotation with an accuracy of 99.29%
on the test set, considering that some digits are difficult to
distinguish their rotations such as ‘1’, ‘6’, ‘8’, and ‘9’. We
suspect that there are some subtle clues the network is able
to pick up and relies on making the prediction.
For fair comparisons, we reimplement all the models, both
supervised and unsupervised, with the same architecture used
in Papernot & McDaniel. We also experiment with different
model-specific hyperparameters such as a constant that bal-
ances two loss functions in SNN loss and Mixup techniques,
but we only report the ones that yield the best robustness
with comparable accuracy. For all of the models, we take
the representation from the third convolutional layer as we
find that it offers a good balance between clean accuracy and
robustness.
4.2 Evaluations
Finding an optimal attack on kNN is intractable for a large
k. Therefore, we rely on a heuristic from Sitawarin & Wag-
ner (Sitawarin and Wagner 2019) to find the minimal `2-
perturbation. The attack approximates kNN as a differen-
tiable function and solves it as an optimization problem using
gradient descent. We modify the original code slightly to
work with Euclidean distance and remove the threshold func-
tion as we do not observe any noticeable difference without
it. We refer the readers to the original paper for more details
on the attack and to Appendix A for our hyperparameters of
the attack.
4.3 Main Results
Table 2 displays the main results, comparing the robustness
and accuracy of all the seven models. The mean `2 is an
average `2-norm of perturbation required to change the clas-
sification of the kNN on the entire test set. A larger norm
suggests that the representation is less sensitive to adversarial
perturbation and potentially contains robust features. The
robustness and clean accuracy of the same models but with-
out the kNN are also included in Table 1 for comparison.
Notably, the kNN appears to increase the robustness of all
the supervised models with a cost of a small drop on clean
accuracy.
On average, kNN on supervised representations has a
higher clean accuracy than the ones on unsupervised fea-
tures. This is expected because supervised models, which
utilize label signal, are trained for a discriminative task, and
so samples from the same class have to activate a similar set
of features. This is not necessary the case for unsupervised
tasks as the representations can be more complex and are not
necessarily clustered by class.
The model trained with SNN loss achieves the highest
accuracy since the loss encourages clustering of samples in
the same class, but it also has the lowest robustness, poten-
tially due to clustering-focused mapping makes the network
particularly sensitive. The kNN on the pixel space is the most
robust but also the least accurate, suggesting a recurring trend
of the trade-off between clean accuracy and robustness. Com-
pared to the basic model, the two mixup models do not yield
any substantial change in the robustness.
Perhaps surprisingly, features learned by the autoencoder
appear to be the most robust among the networks, surpassing
all of the supervised models. Since the VAE exhibits much
Models Clean Acc. Mean `2 Acc. at `2 ≤ 1 Acc. at `2 ≤ 2 Acc. at `2 ≤ 3
Basic Network 0.9878 1.4684 0.7820 0.1363 0.0098
SNN Loss 0.9919 1.2529 0.6747 0.0619 0.0035
Input Mixup 0.9887 0.6051 0.0295 0.0087 0.0087
Manifold Mixup 0.9917 0.9749 0.3942 0.0042 0.0018
Table 1: Robustness and clean accuracy of all the networks trained on MNIST (without kNN), excluding the ones that involve
adversarial training. Here, the adversarial examples are generated by CW attack (500 iterations, 10 binary searches, initial c of
10, learning rate of 0.1).
Models Clean Acc. Mean `2 Acc. at `2 ≤ 1 Acc. at `2 ≤ 2 Acc. at `2 ≤ 3
ABS (Schott et al. 2019) 0.990 2.3 - - -
L2NNN (Qian and Wegman 2019) 0.982 - - - 0.244
kNN (k = 75) 0.9457 3.1389 0.8907 0.7675 0.5579
Basic Network 0.9870 2.1054 0.9103 0.5014 0.1144
SNN Loss 0.9940 1.7131 0.8558 0.2661 0.0547
Input Mixup 0.9812 2.0682 0.8133 0.5007 0.1729
Manifold Mixup 0.9838 2.2276 0.9020 0.5272 0.1790
Autoencoder 0.9509 3.0717 0.8855 0.7449 0.5336
VAE 0.9680 2.0859 0.8201 0.4876 0.1674
Rotation 0.9129 2.2157 0.7532 0.4830 0.1990
Table 2: Robustness and clean accuracy of the kNN on representations learned by all of the networks trained on MNIST, except
for those that involve adversarial training (middle: supervised models, bottom: unsupervised models). The top two rows show the
result from state-of-the-art defenses, taken directly from the original papers.
less robustness, it is unlikely that the bottleneck architecture
plays an important role. Although having a much lower accu-
racy, the plain kNN as well as the kNN on the autoencoder
are more robust than the state-of-the-art defenses, ABS and
L2NNN, by a significant margin.
It is likely that the attack does not find adversarial examples
with the smallest perturbation, but this is the only attack, to
the extend of our knowledge, that reliably and efficiently find
adversarial examples with close to 100% success rate. In
the next section, we improve the robustness of some of the
models further by combining with adversarial training and
evaluate their robustness in more detail.
4.4 kNN on Adversarially Trained Models
Adversarial retraining is one of a few methods which effec-
tively improve adversarial robustness and has been shown
to encourage networks to learn more robust features (Madry
et al. 2017; Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018). We pick a
subset of the networks in Section 4.3 and adversarially train
them with the original objective. For the `∞-adversarial train-
ing, we use 40 steps of size 0.01 with a maximum norm of
0.3, and 40 steps of size 0.1 for the `2 version, except for the
rotation model which uses 20 steps of size 0.05. The results
are reported on Table 3.
Initially, `∞-Adv appears very robust to the attack, we sus-
pect that this is caused by the gradient obfuscation problem
where a gradient-based attack fails to find good adversarial
examples (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018). As a result,
we evaluate some of the models with a boundary-based at-
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Figure 2: A comparison between `2-norm of the adversarial
perturbation generated by the gradient attack (Sitawarin and
Wagner 2019) and by the boundary attack (Brendel, Rauber,
and Bethge 2018) on each of the first hundred samples in the
test set (Left: autoencoder, Right: `2-Adv). The boundary
attack is run twice with two sets of hyperparameters; The
better of the two is chosen. The red line indicates x = y or
the points where the two attacks find adversarial perturbation
with the same norm.
tack which only relies on hard labels (Brendel, Rauber, and
Bethge 2018). We use the official implementation in Fool-
box (Rauber, Brendel, and Bethge 2017). Still, the attack is
extremely slow so we only manage to run the attack on the
first hundred samples in the test set. The boundary attack
does not always succeed, but we find that the mean pertur-
bation norm is about 2.0 on `∞-Adv which is much smaller
Models Clean Acc. Mean `2 Acc. at `2 ≤ 1 Acc. at `2 ≤ 2 Acc. at `2 ≤ 3
`2-Adv (no kNN) 0.9470 2.9060 0.8918 0.7575 0.4764
`∞-Adv 0.9653 ≈ 2.0* - - -
`2-Adv 0.9726 3.0378 0.9387 0.8027 0.5095
`2-Adv-Rot 0.9716 2.9973 0.9658 0.8302 0.4571
`2-Adv-AE 0.9641 3.0198 0.9323 0.8112 0.4899
Table 3: Robustness and clean accuracy of the networks trained with adversarial training. (*) The attack we use struggle to find
adversarial examples for `∞-Adv, most likely due to gradient obfuscation problem. With a boundary-based attack, we manage to
find much smaller adversarial perturbation of about 2.0 averaged over the first 100 samples in the test set.
Clean
Basic (no kNN)𝑙"-Adv (no kNN)
Basic
AE𝑙"-Adv𝑙"-Adv-AE
Clean
𝑙"-Adv 
(no kNN)
𝑙"-Adv
Figure 3: Adversarial examples on different models on MNIST (left) and CIFAR-10 (right). Adversarial examples on models
without the kNN part are generated by CW attack, and those with kNN are generated by the gradient attack. On the CIFAR-10
models, we also show the adversarial perturbation scaled to the range [0, 1]. We omit adversarial examples on ResNet (both with
and without kNN) since the perturbation is essentially imperceptible.
than the ones found by the gradient attack. Nonetheless, the
other models do not appear to have the same problem as the
two attacks find adversarial examples of a comparable size.
Figure 2 shows plots comparing the perturbation norm of
the two attacks on two models. The gradient attack strictly
performs better than the boundary attack on the autoencoder
and roughly the same on average on `2-Adv.
All of the models, except for `∞-Adv, exhibit similarly
strong robustness. `2-Adv is significantly more robust than
its original version (Basic Network with kNN) by sacrificing
the clean accuracy. Interestingly, with the kNN, both of the
unsupervised models, `2-Adv-Rot and `2-Adv-AE, achieve
higher accuracy with the similar or improved robustness. This
is unexpected as the unsupervised models still do not have
an access to the labels. Also, it is well-known that supervised
adversarial training generally reduces accuracy on benign
samples.
We suspect that the adversarial training forces the model
to learn robust features which are also more likely shared
between samples from the same class. Consequently, they
cluster more in the representation space of the adversari-
ally trained models, increasing both the robustness and the
accuracy of the kNN. On the other hand, for example, the
rotation model without adversarial training predicts the rota-
tion with a surprisingly high accuracy (where it should not as
we mentioned in Section 4.1), suggesting that it potentially
learns trivial and non-robust features. As a result, it has poor
robustness as reported in Section 4.3.
It is also important to note that `2-Adv with the kNN has
higher clean accuracy than `2-Adv without one. It contradicts
the trend on the normally trained models, which have lower
accuracy when combined with kNN. This observation shows
that kNN does not always reduce accuracy on benign samples
and helps support our intuition in Section 3 that kNN allows
an access to a better robustness-accuracy trade-off curve
than only relying on adversarial training. We hypothesize
that adversarially trained models (with a sufficiently large )
suffers from a limited class of functions it can represent as
high sensitivity is heavily penalized by the adversarial loss.
So in some cases such as this one, kNN can simultaneously
improve the robustness and the clean accuracy.
4.5 Analysis of Robustness via Local Intrinsic
Dimension and Sensitivity
To better explain the robustness of different representations,
we attempt to attribute it to two characteristics: (1) local
intrinsic dimension (LID) and (2) sensitivity. First, the ro-
bustness of 1-NN has been analyzed and shown to depend
on LID of the input space (Amsaleg et al. 2017). Specifically,
Amsaleg et al. shows that as LID of a given input approaches
Model LID Norm of Jacobian
Input 12.87 1*
Basic Model 8.51 26.24
SNN Loss 7.00 37.83
VAE 9.38 2.12
Autoencoder 14.48 1.47
`∞-Adv 6.58 9.45
`2-Adv 6.47 1.76
`2-Adv-AE 9.74 0.29
Table 4: LID and spectral norm of the Jacobian matrix from
input to the features of the third layer of the networks.
Similarly to previous works, we use the Maximum Like-
lihood Estimator to approximate LID (Amsaleg et al. 2017;
Ma et al. 2018). Both LID and Jacobian norm are calculated
and averaged on the first thousand samples in the test set.
(*) “Input” means MNIST in the pixel space without passing
through any network so, equivalently, it has Jacobian norm
of 1.
infinity, the size of the perturbation required to change its
k-th neighbor into the first neighbor tends to zero. Loosely
speaking, data that cluster have smaller LID.
Sensitivity plays a more straightforward role in the robust-
ness; Models that are less sensitive to a small change on the
input should also be more robust to adversarial examples.
However, it is unclear how to measure sensitivity for our task.
For simplicity, we consider local sensitivity measured by
spectral norm of Jacobian of the input to the representation at
the layer of interest. Combining the two metrics, we expect
that a representation with small LID and small spectral norm
will be more robust than the one with large LID and large
spectral norm.
Table 4 shows LID and sensitivity of a subset of the repre-
sentations. There are several interesting observations:
1. Except for the VAE, the models with a small Jacobian norm
(i.e. “Input,” AE, `2-Adv, `2-Adv-AE) are very robust.
2. As expected, supervised models have smaller LID, and
adversarial training reduces the sensitivity.
3. While LID of SNN Loss are small, they are also very
sensitive. This might explain why it is the least robust. The
SNN loss which encourages clustering of samples in the
same class leads to low LID (since the neighbors are dense)
but also high sensitivity.
4. `∞-Adv does not have particularly small LID or Jacobian
norm, suggesting that it is not as robust, confirming our
evaluation with the boundary-based attack.
These metrics can serve as a sanity-check for the empirical
results as well as give us a better idea of what contributes
to the robustness, but they are far from being an accurate
measurement of the adversarial robustness. Nonetheless, with
this intuition, one might find representation learning that
directly encourages these components (i.e. small LID and
sensitivity) to be useful in future directions.
5 Heuristic Defense on CIFAR-10
We attempt to extend our scheme to a more complex dataset
like CIFAR-10. We evaluate representations of two models:
a pre-activation ResNet (He et al. 2016) with 20 layers and
its adversarially trained version (`2-Adv). We use 8 steps of
adversarial training with a step size of 0.05. Both models are
trained with Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 1e-3 and
batch size of 128. We also experimented with other unsuper-
vised models, similarly to the MNIST experiments. However,
the accuracy of kNN on most of their representations is too
low to consider. For datasets larger than MNIST, the repre-
sentation may need to be either trained or fine-tuned in a
supervised manner in order to reach a comparable accuracy
on kNN.
As shown in Table 5, the adversarial training still pro-
vides a significant improvement in the robustness, again,
with some drop on the clean accuracy. When combined with
kNN, the adversarially trained model becomes more robust
which aligns with the results on MNIST. However, the vanilla
ResNet unexpectedly becomes less robust. The `2-Adv has
a slightly higher accuracy and is significantly more robust
compared to the state-of-the-art L2NNN. This result suggests
that with an appropriate choice of the representation, kNN
still strengthens the network with little-to-no drop in the clean
accuracy even on a larger dataset. Note that we only use a
relatively small ResNet-20 to demonstrate the improvement
gained from kNN while it is highly likely that larger networks
will achieve even higher robustness and accuracy.
6 Certifiable Defense
In addition to the heuristic defense, we propose a novel
construction of a certifiable defense based on our scheme
with some specific components: a 1-nearest neighbor (1-
NN) on features from a Lipschitz network. Lipschitz net-
work, a network that is a Lipschitz function, is one of sev-
eral frameworks that allow computation of a lower bound
of the norm of the adversarial perturbation required to
change the classification of a given input. In other words,
a given input is robust to any perturbation with a norm
smaller than the bound. In most of the previous works,
to increase adversarial robustness, Lipschitz networks are
trained to maximize a margin m(x) between the logits of
the correct class and the second largest logits, i.e. m(x) =
f(x)c − maxi 6=c f(x)i where f(x) is the logits of input x.
Then, the lower bound of the perturbation norm required
to change the classification of a given input is given as
m(x)/
√
2L for `2-norm or m(x)/2L for `∞-norm where L
is the Lipschitz constant (Tsuzuku, Sato, and Sugiyama 2018;
Huster, Chiang, and Chadha 2018; Qian and Wegman 2019;
Anil, Lucas, and Grosse 2018).
Using a similar notion, we can define the margin for 1-NN
as difference between distance from an input to the near-
est neighbor of the correct class and distance to the nearest
neighbor of the wrong class, i.e. the margin
m(x) = min
zˆ∈Xi:i6=c
‖x− zˆ‖2 − minz∈Xc ‖x− z‖2
where c is the true label of x, and Xi is a set of training
samples from class i. It follows that the lower bound of the `2-
Models Clean Acc. Mean `2 Acc. at `2 ≤ 0.5 Acc. at `2 ≤ 1 Acc. at `2 ≤ 1.5
L2NNN (Qian and Wegman 2019) 0.772 - - - 0.204
ResNet (no kNN) 0.9299 0.2124 0.0332 0.0018 0.0006
`2-Adv (no kNN) 0.8045 1.2400 0.6847 0.4924 0.2705
ResNet 0.9301 0.1429 0.0012 0.0001 0.0001
`2-Adv 0.7945 2.2970 0.7447 0.6370 0.5151
Table 5: Robustness and clean accuracy of the two networks trained on CIFAR-10 and the kNN’s on their representation. For
comparison, the first row shows accuracy of L2NNN on CIFAR-10 taken directly from the original paper (Qian and Wegman
2019).
Layers Clean Acc. Avg. Cert. ‖δ‖2 < 0.5 ‖δ‖2 < 1 ‖δ‖2 < 1.5 ‖δ‖2 < 2
ABS (Schott et al. 2019) 0.99 0.69 - - - -
LMT (Tsuzuku, Sato, and Sugiyama 2018) ≈ 0.95 1.02 - - - -
Input 0.9683 0.9567 0.8102 0.4059 0.0977 0.0064
relu1 0.9701 0.8576 0.8000 0.3574 0.0663 0.0034
relu2 0.9723 0.7821 0.7648 0.2677 0.0379 0.0005
relu3 0.9745 0.4295 0.3509 0.0013 0.0 0.0
bottleneck 0.9752 0.3909 0.2668 0.0001 0.0 0.0
Table 6: Clean accuracy and robustness certificate provided by our scheme: 1-NN on the Lipschitz autoencoder. The first two
rows include results from the related works for comparison. The last four columns show the percentage of test samples that the
adversary cannot change their classification given four different ‖δ‖2 budgets (0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2).
norm of the perturbation needed to change the classification
of 1-NN ism(x)/2, assuming thatm(x) ≥ 0 (otherwise, x is
already misclassified). Note that the bound is very simplistic
and only tight when x is a convex combination of z and zˆ. In
fact, an optimal perturbation for 1-NN (minimal Euclidean
distance from x to the edge of the nearest Voronoi cell of
a different class) can be computed by solving a quadratic
program. Nonetheless, it is still expensive to solve for a large
number of constraints. While we believe that k > 1 provides
more robustness, it is not clear how to find the Voronoi cells
efficiently or to provide the bound for a large k. We leave this
direction to future works.
Now returning to our scheme, we consider the case where
the input to 1-NN is a representation from a Lipschitz network
with Lipschitz constant of 1 in `2-norm. The same bound,
in fact, still applies to the `2-norm of the perturbation in the
pixel space: ‖δ‖2 ≥ m(x)/2, but m(x) is now defined on
the representation space instead of the input space: m(x) =
minzˆ∈Xi:i6=c ‖fl(x)− fl(zˆ)‖2 −minz∈Xc ‖fl(x)− fl(z)‖2
where fl(x) is an output at l-th layer of the network given
input x. We refer to Appendix B for the proof.
6.1 Experimental Setup
To train a Lipschitz network, we use the same method as
Qian & Wegman (Qian and Wegman 2019). We implement
an autoencoder that has the same architecture as the one in
Section 4 but with the encoder now being a Lipschitz net-
work. We choose the autoencoder since it performs well as
a heuristic defense and is compatible with our loss function
below. Through a number of experiments, we find that train-
ing the autoencoder with the MSE reconstruction loss and
an additional regularization on the bottleneck layer which
directly maximizes the distance between samples from dif-
ferent classes consistently yields good clean accuracy and
robustness on MNIST. The loss function of our network can
be written as:
L(x) = ‖f(x)− x‖22 −min{min
xˆ∈Bx
‖fb(x)− fb(xˆ)‖22 , T}
where f(·) is the output of the autoencoder, and fb(·) is the
output at the bottleneck layer. Bx is a set of samples in the
same batch as x that have a different label, and T is a thresh-
old. The reconstruction loss (first term) is needed to cluster
samples from the same class together, which affects the accu-
racy, while the regularization (second term) encourages the
representations to be some distance apart up to the threshold.
For each of the test samples x, we compute the margin
m(x) and the lower bound of the perturbation norm,m(x)/2,
using different layers of the encoder.
6.2 Results
We report clean accuracy and the robustness certificates pro-
vided by our scheme on each of the layers of the network
(Table 6). The layer closer to input has lower accuracy but a
larger lower bound. The “Input” row in the table is simply a
1-NN on the input space, which provides a very large mean
lower bound of 1.8 while achieving reasonable accuracy. The
average lower bound which is 1.8/2 = 0.9 is nontrivial, con-
sidering that the mean `2-norm of the perturbation used to
fool networks without a defense is around 1.5.
In comparison with the related works, our scheme achieves
higher accuracy with a slightly smaller bound than LMT
(Tsuzuku, Sato, and Sugiyama 2018) and a larger bound with
lower accuracy compared to ABS (Schott et al. 2019). Using
the first layer, we can guarantee that 80% of the classification
of the test samples cannot be changed by any perturbation
with an `2-norm less than 0.5. Nonetheless, on the bottleneck
layer, we can only certify up to 27%. The bound becomes
smaller for the deeper layers because our network is not
perfectly `2-norm preserving. Consequently, distance to the
nearest samples of a wrong class as well as the margin dimin-
ishes as the input is passed through the network.
We also attack our certifiable defense (relu1) with the
heuristic attack and achieve the average perturbation norm of
1.82, which is twice as large as the average lower bound given
by the 1-NN. The gap is contributed by both the looseness of
our lower bound and the fact that the heuristic attack does not
find the optimal perturbation. Nevertheless, this suggests that
our scheme already produces a nontrivial certificate using
only a naive lower bound.
Due to the flexibility of the scheme, by using a different
choice of networks and hyperparameters, one can easily ob-
tain a model with a higher accuracy but a smaller bound or
vice versa. Nonetheless, a better construction of Lipschitz
and `2-norm preserving networks is needed for our scheme
to scale to larger datasets.
7 Conclusion
We propose a scheme combining kNN and robust represen-
tation learning as a defense against adversarial examples on
MNIST and CIFAR-10. Our method pushes the accuracy-
robustness trade-off curve further and is straightforward to
construct. It is a general and flexible framework that provides
clear directions to improve upon. Namely, one can improve
it by learning more robust representations or by finding an
adversarially robust variant of kNN. The two problems can
be pursued independently, and we believe that they are both
interesting on their own. We hope that our scheme will also
inspire future architecture designs for robust neural networks
that implicitly or explicitly impose a similarity search.
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A Gradient-Based Attack on kNN
In summary, the attack operates by adding a perturbation δ to
the input such that its representation, f(x), moves closer to
representations of a nearest group of training instances from
a different class (xi for i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}). This heuristic can
be formulated as a constrained optimization problem as the
following.
δ∗ = arg min
δ
m∑
i=1
‖f(xi)− f(x+ δ)‖22
such that ‖δ‖2 ≤  and x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]d
The box constraint [0, 1] is to ensure that the perturbed
input lies in the feasible input region which in this case, is
between 0 and 1 for pixel values. The optimization can be
formulated as a Lagrangian, and so we can binary search
the Lagrangian constant that yields the minimal perturbation.
The optimization is solved with Adam optimizer.
For most of the models on MNIST, we use m = 100, the
initial Lagrangian constant c of 1e-3, a learning rate of 1e-1,
a maximum iteration of 500, and 10 binary search steps. For
adversarially trained models or more robust models like the
autoencoder, we have to increase c to 1e-1 and the number
of iterations to 1000 in order to achieve near 100% attack
success rate. For CIFAR-10, c is set to 1e-5 for the vanilla
ResNet and to 1e-3 for the adversarial training. We use a
learning rate of 1e-2, 500 iterations, and again, 10 binary
search steps.
B Proof on Certifiable Defense
Here, we refer to Lipschitz networks as neural networks that
are a Lipschitz function with a constant L in some `p-norm.
More precisely, let f : Rn → Rd be the neural network func-
tion that maps inputs to some representation (e.g. logits or
intermediate layers) with dimension d. Now f is L-Lipschitz
if
‖f(x1)− f(x2)‖p ≤ L · ‖x1 − x2‖p (2)
Equation 2 can be rearranged by replacing x1 with an input
x and x2 with x+ δ where δ is a perturbation:
‖f(x)− f(x+ δ)‖p ≤ L · ‖δ‖p (3)
Now we consider a particular case where p = 2 and L = 1,
and define f(x) − f(x + δ) as ∆. Let g be the distance
function that maps a representation f(x) to distance between
f(x) and f(xi) where {xi}1≤i≤N are the training samples,
i.e.
g(x)i = ‖f(x)− f(xi)‖2
We want to show a simple bound on ‖g(x)− g(x+ δ)‖∞:
‖g(f(x))− g(f(x) + ∆)‖∞
= max
i
|g(f(x))i − g(f(x) + ∆)i|
= max
i
| ‖f(x)− f(xi)‖2 − ‖f(x)− f(xi) + ∆‖2 |
≤ max
i
| ‖∆‖2 | (from triangular inequality)
= ‖∆‖2
Since from Equation 3, we know that ‖∆‖2 =‖f(x)− f(x+ δ)‖2 ≤ ‖δ‖2, we get the bound:
‖g(x)− g(x+ δ)‖∞ ≤ ‖δ‖2 (4)
For 1-NN, the classification of x is simply the class of
xc where c = arg mini g(x)i. So in order to change the
classification of x, one must reduce the margin m(x) =
mini∈S g(x)i − g(x)c to zero where S is a set of indices
of training samples that are not from the same class as xc.
In the worst case, an adversary can do so by decreasing
mini∈S g(x)i by m(x)/2 and increasing g(x)c by m(x)/2
simultaneously, which can only be achieved when x is a con-
vex combination of xc and the nearest neighbor of a different
class. This implies that if h(x)/2 ≥ ‖g(x)− g(x+ δ)‖∞
then there is no δ that will change the class of x.
The other way to arrive at this bound is to notice that
h(x) is 2-Lipschitz with respect to g(x). So similarly, we
have ‖m(x)−m(x+ δ)‖∞ ≤ 2 ‖g(x)− g(x+ δ)‖∞. To
summarize, our lower bound of the perturbation required to
change the prediction of a 1-NN classifier is
‖δ‖2 ≥ m(x)/2 (5)
Or in other words, there exists no δ with ‖δ‖2 < m(x)/2
such that x and x+ δ are classified to different labels. This
lower bound is similar but not the same as the margin in
logits for the Lipschitz networks proposed by previous works.
We believe that Lipschitz networks can learn a larger margin
while achieving a high accuracy with 1-NN. We omit the case
where k > 1 here as the bound is much more complicated to
compute and potentially looser.
